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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020892-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that defendant
is not entitled to a conviction for misdemeanor identity fraud instead of felony forgery where
the forgery and identity fraud statutes do not proscribe the same conduct, and defendant's use
of a writing to accomplish his fraud justifies his forgery conviction.
"'Our review under the Shondel rule focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions,
which we review under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to

the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Green, 995 P.2d 1250 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting State v.
Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App.1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to the issue raised on appeal and are attached at
Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6 501 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 6,2002, defendant Anthony James Valdez was charged by information
with forgery, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(R. 2). A jury
trial was held, during which defendant sought a directed verdict out of the presence of the
jury after the State rested its case (R. 64: 92-94).x He based his motion on an alleged lack
of evidence and on his evaluation that the case "more properly should have been charged as
identity fraud" (R. 64:96). In arguing his motion to the court, defense counsel noted that the
two statutes are "almost identical" and identified for the court at least two differences
between the statutes (R. 64: 94-96). The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict,
explaining that it was the utterance of a writing in this case that justified the forgery charge
(R. 64: 96). The court then stated:

!

In the same argument to the trial court, defense counsel also asked "that the count
be amended to a count of identity fraud, a Class B misdemeanor" (R. 64: 96). The court
ruled solely on the request for a directed verdict (id.). Add. B.
2

So you may try and use it [identity fraud] as a lesser included, but I
think that there's surely sufficient enough evidence to show that the more
serious crime of forgery was committed.
(R. 64: 96). The trial court permitted the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction on
identity fraud, and continued the trial (R. 94:96) (oral ruling attached in Addendum B). The
jury convicted defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate
term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. 48; R. 64:139). Defendant filed
a timely notice of appeal (R. 50).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
Close to noon on October 29,2001, Amber Hamlin took her 1988 Chevrolet Baretta
to Master Muffler and Brake in Keams, UT (R. 64: 21). The vehicle needed repairs on the
exhaust system and replacement of the catalytic converter (R. 64: 23). Jeremy Jeffs was the
mechanic on duty that day (R. 64:21). Jeffs knew Ms. Hamlin from Junior High school and
had seen her "off and on" since then (R. 64:22).
Defendant accompanied Ms. Hamlin when she dropped off the car (R. 64:25). Ms.
Hamlin came into the shop to talk to Jeffs while defendant remained outside of the shop area
(R. 64:25). Jeffs saw Ms. Hamlin and defendant walking together as they left (R. 64:25,28).
Jeffs later identified defendant in court (R. 64:24).
Defendant, Ms. Hamlin, and another man returned around 5:30 that evening to pick
up the car (R. 64:35, 36). Ms. Hamlin came into the shop area again and talked with Jeffs

2

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995).
3

as he was lying underneath a vehicle (R. 64:26). Jeffs' supervisor, Dennis Hogge, was
working in the office area/waiting room when defendant came in and said he was there to
pick up Ms. Hamlin's car and pay the repair bill (R. 64:30, 34). Defendant explained that
he was paying the bill because he owed Ms. Hamlin some money (R. 64:36). The repair bill
came to $278.71 (R. 64:34). Defendant presented Hogge with a completed check that had
been filled out beforehand (R. 64:36). The check belonged to, and had the signature of, James
Batley (R. 64:34; State's Ex . #1). When Hogge received the check he wrote down the
driver's license number and driver's license expiration date from the driver's license that
defendant showed him for identification purposes (R. 64:38). He did not, however, look at
either the name or the picture on the license (id.). Police later found that the license number
belonged to Tammy Searcy, who is not involved in this litigation (R. 64:38, State's Ex. #4).
Defendant also signed the catalytic converter form that is required by the EPA
whenever a catalytic converter is replaced (R. 64:39). The shop keeps a copy of this form
on file, and sends a copy to the Environmental Protection Agency (R. 64:40). Hogge filled
out all of this catalytic converter form except for the signature, and then defendant signed it
with a name purporting to be "James Batley" (R. 64:40,42-43, State's Exh. 2). The second
man accompanying defendant played no role in the transaction (R. 64:35). Hogge testified
that the same person who gave him the check signed the converter form (R. 64:43). Hogge
identified defendant in court but did not recognize Tammy Searcy when shown a picture of
her (R. 64:35,43).

4

About ten days later the check was returned from the collection agency to the shop
marked, "LOST/STOLEN." (R. 64:41, State's Ex. #1). The face of the check bore the name
"James Batley" and an address (R. 64:57). Bob Elder, assistant manager of the muffler store,
called Mr. Batley, who told him that the check was one of several that had been stolen from
Batley's car earlier that same month (R. 64:32,42, 55-56). Mr. Batley had not signed any
of the checks before they were stolen and had not given anyone permission to sign his name
on them (R. 64:59). Mr. Batley did not know either Amber or defendant (R. 64: 59).
Detective Dalton Campbell took the returned check and converter form into custody
for his investigation (R. 64:65). He had the check and the converter form processed at the
crime lab (R. 64: 68). No positive identification was obtained from the check (R. 64:85).
However, Mr. Fassett did find 12 or 13 points of comparison on a print lifted from the
converter form and testified that it matched defendant's left ring finger (R. 64:90).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim that the forgery and identity fraud statutes proscribe the same
conduct, requiring that he be convicted of identify fraud under Shondel because it carries the
lesser penalty, is without merit. Shondel requires that the statutes proscribe exactly the same
conduct, i.e., contain the same elements. There is no Shondel issue here because the
elements of the two statutes are not identical. Forgery cannot be completed absent the use
of a writing, and identity fraud has no such requirement. Identity fraud requires that the
person whose identifying information is taken be a real person, but forgery has no such
requirement. Further, identity fraud requires proof of the value of the item or services
5

wrongfully obtained, while forgery has no such requirement. The conduct violating each
statute may very well be similar. However, forgery is a particular type of fraudulent use of
information which the legislature reasonably has chosen to punish more severely than the
general use of another's fraudulent information, as would be punished under the identity
fraud statute.
Because the statutes are distinguishable, Shondel is not applicable, and defendant's
claim of error fails.
ARGUMENT
THE IDENTITY FRAUD AND FORGERY STATUTES DO NOT
PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT, AND DEFENDANT'S USE OF
A WRITING TO ACCOMPLISH HIS FRAUD JUSTIFIED HIS
CONVICTION UNDER THE STATUTE CARRYING THE MORE
SEVERE SENTENCE
Defendant seeks re-sentencing. Br. of Aplt. at 7,22. He presents a Shondel argument,
claiming that because his criminal conduct subjects him to punishment under two separate
criminal statutes, and, because the elements of those offenses are "indistinguishable" or
"nearly identical[,]" he is entitled to be convicted of the offense which carries the more
lenient sentence.3 Id. at 6-22. Specifically, he argues that the identity fraud statute and the
forgery statute both cover his presentation of a forged check and endorsement of a forged
signature, but that he should have been convicted of identity fraud instead of forgery because
identity fraud carries the more lenient sentence: a class B misdemeanor, as opposed to the

Pursuant to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969).
6

third degree felony imposed pursuant to his forgery conviction. Id, However, defendant's
claim fails because the statutes are readily distinguishable.
Under Shondel, "if one or both of the crimes at issue 'require[] proof of some fact or
element not required to establish the other,' the statutes do not criminalize identical conduct
and the State can charge an individual with the crime carrying the higher classification or
more severe sentence." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 47,52 P.3d 1194 (quoting State
v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah 1981)), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 123 S. Ct. 859 (Jan.

13,2003); see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4,f 21, 57 P.3d 977 (stating that when elements
of crimes differ, no equal protection violation under Shondel lies), cert, denied,

U.S.

,

123 S. Ct. 257 (Oct. 7, 2002); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that
Shondel applies only when the two statutes are "wholly duplicative" as to the crime's
elements). The Shondel doctrine ensures that the criminal laws are written so that "there are
significant differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to
different penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to
charge." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at % 48 (citing Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263). Shondel requires
"that a prosecutor who elects to charge an individual with a crime carrying a higher penalty
or classification do so knowing that the prosecutor will be required to prove at least one
additional or different element to obtain a conviction for the higher-penalty crime."
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at f 48.
To evaluate defendant's claim, this Court must determine whether the two statutes
proscribe exactly the same conduct and whether the elements of each crime are "wholly
7

duplicative." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263; see also State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah
1986).
The relevant part of the forgery statute provides
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or
utters any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent..."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). Add. A.
The identity fraud statute provides:

(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or
intentionally:
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another
person without the authorization of that person; and
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with
fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain,
credit, goods, services, any other thing of value, or medical
information in the name of another person without the consent
of that person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit,
goods, services, or any other thing of value is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor if:
(i) a value cannot be determined and the
personal identifying information has been used to
obtain medical information in the name of another
person without the consent of that person; or
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(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services,
or any other thing of value is or exceeds $300 but
is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods,
services, or any other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is
less than $5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit,
goods, services, or any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) & (3) (Supp. 2001). Add. A.
A comparison of these statutes shows several differences:
1. Forgery requires use of a writing; identity fraud does not.
2. Identity fraud requires that the personal identifying information belong to a live
person; forgery is committed whether the writing purports to be the act of a live, dead,
or a fictitious person.
3. Identity fraud requires proof of the value of the credit, goods, services, or other
thing of value illegally obtained or sought to be obtained; forgery requires no such
proof.
Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501 with 76-6-1102. That these differences are sufficient
to distinguish the offenses and permit defendant's conviction for forgery is clear under Utah
case law.
This case is controlled by the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 722
P.2d 747 (Utah 1986) (attached in Addendum C). In Gomez, defendants Steve and
Jacqueline Gomez signed sales slips in the course of making purchases with someone else's
improperly-obtained credit card. Id. at 748. Both were charged under Utah Code Ann. § 766-506.1, involving wrongful use of a financial transaction card, a second degree felony. Id.
Counsel for one defendant moved to reduce the charges either to a third degree felony under

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2, which also punished unlawful use of financial transaction
cards, on the grounds that the statutes proscribe the same conduct and, therefore, defendant
had a right to be charged under the offense carrying the lesser penally. Id. The trial court
agreed, suggested amendment of the information to charge a lesser offense, and, upon the
State's refusal, dismissed the information as to that defendant. Id. at 748-49. The court
dismissed the co-defendant's information for the same reason upon stipulation by the parties
that she should be treated like her co-defendant. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed as to both defendants, finding that the statutes do
not have identical elements. Id. at 749-50. The Court determined that section 76-6-506.1
requires proof of a "signing" of a sales slip, while section 76-6-506.2 does not. Id. at 749.
The Court also noted that section 76-6-506.2 requires proof of the value of the items
fraudulently purchased, while section 76-6-506.1 does not. Id. In holding that the statutes
did not proscribe the same conduct, the Supreme Court explained that the legislature had and
exercised the power to determine "that the act of fraudulently 'signing a card or sales slip
should be punished more severely than the mere fraudulent use of a financial transaction
card." Id. at 749. While "the reason for the distinction between subsections -506.1 and 506.2 in the financial transaction card offenses is rather hard to fathom, especially when most
credit card sales probably involve a 'signing,'" the Court was unable to opine that it is
"irrational or arbitrary."

Id. at 750 (footnote omitted which identified examples of

transactions not involving a "signing").
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Not only does the same rationale apply in this case, but the statutes reflect the same
differences in the elements that appeared in Gomez. The forgery and identity fraud statutes
both punish a defendant for fraudulently obtaining something by pretending to be someone
else. However, the forgery statute, which carries the more severe sentence, requires the use
of a writing, whereas the identity fraud statute does not. Further, the identity fraud statute
requires proof of the value of the fraudulently-obtained gains, while the forgery statute does
not. As in Gomez, these differences demonstrate that the legislature has seen fit to provide
that where the fraud is accomplished by means of a writing, the conduct should be punished
more severely than the mere fraudulent use, without a writing, of someone's personal
identifying information. See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749. Such a determination is within the
power of the legislature. See id:, see also State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075,
1078(1959).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized:
It is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more severe penalty for
a particular type of crime than the penalty which is imposed with respect to the
general category of crimes to which the special crime is related or of which it
is a subcategory . . . . As long as the legislative classifications are not
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general and a specific
provision of the criminal laws does not render the legislation unconstitutional,
even though one violation is subject to a greater sentence.
See Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44; see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50.
Because the identity fraud statute prohibits using personal identifying information of
another generally, and the forgery statute prohibits using such information in the form of a

11

writing specifically, the imposition of a greater penalty for use of a writing is neither
arbitrary nor unconstitutional. See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50.
In this case, defendant was charged with, and convicted of, obtaining goods and
services from the repair shop by means of uttering a check which had previously been stolen
from James Batley and had been filled out by someone else without his authorization. He
also signed Mr. Batley's name to the governmental form required for the type of repair that
had been done. Because his fraudulent conduct was accomplished through means of written
documents, he was properly "'charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence. .
..'" Gomez, 722 P.2d at 750 (quoting Clark, 632 P.2d at 844) (additional citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
defendant's conviction and sentence.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
This case does not present a novel or important issue. Consequently, the State does
not ask that the matter be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this q c d a y of March, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorn^ General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77
PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing* defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecunian
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 19;
1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 15; 1996,
^u

Qf\Z

& 27

76-6-1102. Identity fraud crime.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

2001 Supplement

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B
1999 EDITION
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume.

(1) For purposes of this part, "personal identifying information" may include:
(a) name;
(b) address;
(c) telephone number;
(d) driver's license number;
(e) Social Security number;
(f) place of employment;
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification
numbers;
(h) mother's maiden name;
(i) electronic identification numbers;
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or information that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under
Sections 76-6-506 through 76-6-506.4.
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or
intentionally:
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without
the authorization of that person; and
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent,
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person
without the consent of that person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor if:
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying
information has been used to obtain medical information in the name
of another person without the consent of that person; or
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be
used, through the multiple violations.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1102, e n a c t e d by L.
2000, ch. 57, * 5.
Effective D a t e s . — Laws 2000, ch 57 be-

came effective on May 1 2000, p u r s u a n t to
Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25

Addendum B

^^o^o ^-^a^-r^
-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
) Case No. 021901647 FS

ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ,
Defendant.

)

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

)

NOV - * 2002
Jury Trial
Electronically Recorded on
25, 2002

J£

ALT LAKE COUNTY

Depu y Clerk

j u

yf

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES:
For the State:

NICK DALESANDRO
District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)366-7862

For the Defendant:

Transcribed by:

JOHN D. O'CONNELL, JR.
Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)524-5444

Beverly Lowe CSR/CCT

1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE
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significant, but I'm going to deny your motion.

2

MR. O'CONNELL: Then, your Honor, at this point I'd be

3

moving for a directed verdict.

4

just I don't think the evidence at this point is enough to send

5

it to a jury.

6

I think the first basis, it's

More importantly, the reason why -- this is also to

7

explain why (inaudible) the lesser included instruction it

8

has of identity fraud is that I actually think this is more

9

correctly charged as identity fraud, and not forgery.

10

Identity fraud, the previous statute, is less than

11

—

12

legislature passed recently.

13

commits —

14

Section 2 —

15

knowingly and intentionally obtains personal identifying

16

information of another person without the authorization of

17

that person, and uses or attempts to use that information with

18

fraudulent intent including to obtain or attempt to obtain

19

goods, service, any other thing of value."

20

but that's the provision (inaudible).

21

I think it's only a year old.

It's something that the

In identity fraud, a person who

guilty of identity fraud —

this is from 706-1102

"is guilty of identity fraud when a person

Then it goes on,

I think that's what we have in this case.

We have

22

an individual who has obtained identifying information.

23

Identifying information, by the way, can be as simple as

24

just a name.

25

driver's license number, Social Security number, employment

It could be an address, telephone numbers,
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identification number or other personal identification number,

2

which I would say is similar to having a checking account

3

number.

4

In this case we have somebody's name that's been taken

5

without permission, and that was testified by Mr. Batley, and

6

it was used.

7

services.

8

in that case to try to procure with fraudulent intent goods

9

or services.

In this case it was used on a check to obtain

It was also used to sign onto the certificate form,

In this case I think it was probably a little bit

10

of both.

11

this case.

12

identity fraud is.

13

I assume there were parts involved and services in
That's what happened in this case, and that's what

I actually think when they passed the identity fraud

14

—

15

an identity fraud trial, to the forgery statute, and they're

16

almost identical.

17

forgeries.

18

situation where you have a fictional person involved.

19

identity fraud you need a real person.

20

a real person, Mr. Batley.

21

forget her name, but the woman whose driver's license number

22

was used as well.

23

I looked at the statute and compared it when I actually did

I think there are some differences in

Some type of forgeries, for example, can have a
For

In this case we have

I would just argue we have —

Both are real people.

I

Both were involved.

Also in forgery I don't think you necessarily need

24

to get any property, while in identity fraud you need to get

25

something of value, because identity fraud classification is
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based on how much is taken in value.

2

something taken in value. We also have something that was —

3

we also have a real person involved.

4

In this case we have

So I think that this is more properly should have been

5

charged as identity fraud, and Mr. Valdez is entitled to — if

6

there is another charge that covers the same moment and covers

7

the same conduct, and it is of a lesser charge —

8

it would be a Class A misdemeanor because the value is less

9

than $300 —

in this case

is entitled to be convicted only of that charge.

10

So I would ask that the count be amended to a count of identity

11

fraud, a Class B misdemeanor.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, your motion to dismiss on a

13

directed verdict is denied.

14

Mr. Valdez is the individual that wrote the check and received

15

the goods and services, and I think the difference between

16

identity fraud and forgery is the writing part of it.

17

fraud does not include the utterance of a writing, and in this

18

particular incident we have the uttering of a writing.

19

I think there's testimony that

Identity

So you may try and use it as a lesser included, but I

20

think that there's surely sufficient enough evidence to show

21

that the more serious crime of forgery was committed.

22
23
24
25

Mr. Dalesandro, do you want leave of the record for
anything to supplement the —
MR. DALESANDRO: Well, I think Mr. 0'Connell is ]ust
mixing apples and oranges here.

I think the standard for a
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The State appealed from an order of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M Billings, J,
dismissing an information charging defendants with
wrongful use of a financial transaction card
The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J , held that (1) appeal
from dismissal of information, which was dismissed on
suggestion of State, was a proper appeal by State "from
a final judgment of dismissal", (2) defendants could be
charged under statute proscribing the wrongful use of
a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip,
which carried a more severe sentence than, and
proscnbed different conduct than that proscribed in,
statute prohibiting the mere fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card, and (3) State properly charged
defendants with wrongful use of a financial transaction
card by "signing" a sales slip
Reversed

financial transaction card, without proof of "signing" of
sale slip but with proof of value of items fraudulently
purchased, so that defendants could be charged with
violating UC A, 19S3 76-6-506 1, which was the
offense which carried the more severe penalty
121 False Pretenses €=>7(1)
170k7(T) Most Cited Cases
Distinction between L C A 1953,76-6-506 1, requiring
proof of "signing" of sales slip in order to sustain
conviction for wrongful use of financial transaction
card, and UC A 1953, 76-6-^06 2, which did not
require such proof to convict for mere fraudulent use of
financial transaction card, was neither irrational nor
arbitrary
141 False Pretenses €=^7(1)
170k7( 1) Most Cited Cases
Defendants were properly charged with wrongful use of
a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip,
where defendants allegedly signed another person's
name to sales slips during alleged purchases of goods
with improperly obtained credit card UC A 1953
76-6-506.1
*748 David L Wilkinson, Arty Gen, J Stephen
Mikita, Ted Cannon, Co Arty, Gregory L Bown, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Nancy Bergeson, Khris Harrold, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents

West Headnotes
i l l Criminal Law €=>1024(2)
110kl024(2) Most Cited Cases
Appeal by State from dismissal of information on
suggestion of State was a proper appeal by State "from
a final judgment of dismissal," where trial court
determined that charges were to be reduced to offense
carrying lesser penalty not charged in original
information and, thus, effectively prevented State from
proceeding on the ongmal charges UCA1953,
77-35-26(c)(l)
12] False Pretenses €==>7(1)
170k7(l) Most Cited Cases
U C A 1953, 76-6-506 L proscribing the wrongful use
of a financial transaction card by "signing" a sales slip,
did not proscribe the same conduct as I C A 1953,
76-6-506 2, proscribing the mere fraudulent use of a
Copr e West 2003 No Claim

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
The State of Utah appeals from the trial court's order
dismissing an information charging Steve and
Jacqueline Gomez with wrongful use of a financial
transaction card under section 76-6-506 1 of the Code
The trial court found that sections 76-6-506 1 and
76-6-506 2 proscribed identical conduct, that section
76-6-506.2 earned a lesser penalty, and that the
defendants were entitled to be charged with the lesser
crime We conclude that the statutes do not proscribe
the same conduct because they do not contain the same
elements, therefore, we reverse
In January of 1985, the defendants were each charged
with two counts of wrongful use of a financial
transaction card, a second degree felony
[I M l
U C A , 1953, S 76-6-506 1 (ReplVol 8B, 1978,
Supp 1985) The State alleged that the defendants
Orig U S Govt Works
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signed for purchases of $111 00 and $294 51 by using
the American Express card of one Anne Bogarty
Counsel for Steve Gomez filed a motion to reduce the
charges to either a third degree felony under section
76-6-506.2, or a class A misdemeanor under section
76-6-506 5, on the grounds that sections 76-6-506 1 and
-506 2 proscribe the same conduct and that a defendant
has a right to be charged with the offense carrying the
lesser penalty ITN21 The trial court agreed and
suggested that the information be amended to charge
the lesser offense
The State, however, took the
position that the proper remedy would be a dismissal by
the trial court and refused to amend the information
The trial court *749 then dismissed the information as
to Steve Gomez
Counsel for the State and for
Jacqueline Gomez stipulated that she should be treated
like her co-defendant, and the charges against
Jacqueline were also dismissed The State appeals
from the dismissal

FN1. Section 76-6-506 1 states
Any person who, with intent to defraud,
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or
encodes magnetically or electronically any
financial transaction card, or who with intent
to defraud, signs the name of another or a
fictitious name to a financial transaction card,
sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument for the
payment of money which evidences a
financial transaction card transaction, is guilty
of a felony of the second degree

FN2. Section 76-6-506 2 provides
It is unlawful for any person to
(1)
Knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or
attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt
to purchase goods, property, or services, by
the use of a false, fictitious, altered,
counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or
fraudulently obtained financial transaction
card, by any financial transaction card credit
number, personal identification code, or by the
use of a financial transaction card not
authonzed by theissuer or the card holder, (2)
Use a financial transaction card, with intent to
defraud, to knowingly and willfully exceed the
actual balance of a demand or time deposit
account, (3) Use a financial transaction card,
with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed an
authonzed credit line by $500 or more, or by
50% of such line, whichever is greater, (4)
Willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into
his or any other account by means of an
automated banking device, any false,
fictitious, forged, altered, or counterfeit check,

draft, money order, or any other similar
document, or (5) Make application for a
financial transaction card to an issuer, while
knowingly making or causing to be made a
false statement or report relative to his name
occupation, financial condition, assets, or to
willfully and substantially undervalue or
understate any indebtedness for the purpose of
influencing the issuer to issue the financial
transaction card
Section 76-6-506 5 states
Any person found guilty of unlawful conduct
described in sections 76-6- 506 2, 76-6-506 3,
or
76-6-506 4 is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor If the retail value of the money,
goods, or services obtained or attempted to be
obtained through unlawful conduct described
in sections 76-6-506 2 or 76-6-506 4 is $250
or more, the person is guilty of a felony of the
third degree

Before reaching the merits, we must first determine
whether the State has the authority to appeal Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(c¥ 1) provides that "[a]n
appeal may be taken by the prosecution (1) From a
final judgment of dismissal" U C A , 1953, §
77-35-26(c)(l) (Repl Vol 8C, 1982, Supp 1985) The
defendants argue that the State moved for dismissal and
now attempts to use that order of dismissal to obtain
review of the trial court's decision to reduce the
charges, a decision that would not otherwise be
appealable as a matter of right The defendants assert
that under our recent ruling m Stare v Waddoups Utah,
712P.2d 223 (1985), the Court should not consider that
claim
We agree that the State has a nght to appeal only
[f]rom a final judgment of dismissal" However, the
facts of this case are quite different from those in
Waddoups In Waddoups, the trial court granted a
defense motion to suppress the out-of-court statements
of a witness The State chose not to proceed to trial,
but instead moved to dismiss the information It then
attempted to appeal the dismissal as a matter of right
and to attack the suppression ruling However, the law
is clear that the proper way to obtain review of a
suppression ruling is to ask this Court to grant a
discretionary interlocutory appeal U C A , 1953, §
77-35-26(c)(5) (Repl Vol 8C, 1982, Supp 1985) We
dismissed the appeal
M

[11 In the present case, the trial court's determination
that the charges should be reduced to an offense
carrying a lesser penalty not charged m the onginal
information prevented the State from proceeding on the
original charges The effect of the trial court's ruling
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was to block prosecution and, in effect, to dismiss the
original charges Under these circumstances, the State
properly suggested that the trial court formally dismiss
the information and then appealed "[f]rom a final
judgment of dismissal" These facts do not show an
attempt by the State to skirt the restrictions of Rule 26
appeals We therefore reach the merits
The analytical framework for evaluating the
defendants' claim is set out in State v Br\an Utah, 709
P.2d 257, 263 (1985)
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are
significant differences between offenses and so that
the exact same conduct is not subject to different
penalties depending on which of two statutory
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge To allow
that would be to allow a form of arbitrariness that is
foreign to our system of law
Thus, in the present case, the question is whether the
two statutes at issue proscribe exactly the same
conduct, i e, do they contain the same elements7 See
State v Shondel 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P 2d 146,
148 (1969), State ^ Clark Utah, 632 P 2d 841, 844
(1981), State \> Loveless, Utah, 581 P 2d 575, 576-77
(1978), State v Smathers Utah, 602 P 2d 708, 710
(1979), and State \ Bnan, 709 P 2d at 263-64
[21[31 The State contends that the statutes at issue do
not have identical elements because section 76-6-506 1
requires proof of a "signing" of a sales slip, whereas
section 76-6-506.2 does not, and section 76-6- 506 2
requires proof of the value of items fraudulently
purchased, while section 76-6-506 1 does not We
agree Clearly, the legislature has determined that the
act of fraudulently "signing" a card or sales slip should
be punished more severely than the mere fraudulent use
of a financial transaction card
The legislature
certainly has the power to make such a judgment See
State v Twitchell 8 Utah 2d 314 333 P 2d 1075, 1078
(1959) As we observed in State v Clark
It is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more
severe penalty for a particular type of cnme than the
penalty which is imposed with respect to the general
category of crimes to which the special *750 crime is
related or of which it is a subcategory
As long as the legislative classifications are not
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a
general and a specific provision of the criminal laws
does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even
though one violation is subject to a greater sentence

arbitrary [TN3]

FN3. Examples of transactions that do not
involve a "signmg" include purchases by
telephone or computer modem, use of a bank
automated teller machine, or use of a credit
card for identification

[41 We noted in State v Clark that "when two statutes
under consideration do not proscribe the same conduct
[the] defendant may be charged with the crime
carrying the more severe sentence " 632 P 2d at 844
(citations omitted)
The statutes at issue here are
clearly distinguishable The record indicates that the
defendants were charged with signing another's name to
sales slips when they allegedly made purchases with the
improperly obtained credit card Therefore, the State
acted within its prosecutorial discretion when it charged
Steve and Jacqueline Gomez with a second degree
felony under the "signing" offense, section 76-6-506 1
The trial court's ruling is reversed

HALL, C J , and STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ, concur
722 P 2d 747
END OF DOCUMENT

632 P 2d at 843-44 It is true that the reason for the
distinction between subsections -506 1 and -506 2 in
the financial transaction card offenses is rather hard to
fathom, especially when most credit card sales probably
involve a "signing," but we cannot say it is irrational or
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works

